Brig Anil Gupta The political positioning of the Wangchuk family, particularly Sonam Wangyal (father of Sonam Wangchuk), offers an instructive case study in the complexities of Ladakh’s modern history. Far from being aligned with the dominant current of Ladakhi political assertion in the late 20th century, the family consciously distanced itself from the collective mobilisations that shaped Ladakh’s struggle against Kashmir-centric governance. In his own work, Political Evolution in Post-Independence Ladakh, Sonam Wangyal candidly acknowledges his opposition to the 1989 agitation led by the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA). His stated reason was the LBA’s adoption of a “boycott Muslims” campaign, which he argued undermined inter-community relations. While this position might appear principled on the surface, it requires closer scrutiny. The 1989 agitation cannot be reduced to communal slogans alone. Its roots lay in decades of political and administrative marginalisation of Ladakh within the state of Jammu & Kashmir. Key issues included: Political Disempowerment: Ladakh remained underrepresented in state politics, with decisions dictated from Srinagar. Economic Neglect: Infrastructure, education, and employment opportunities were skewed heavily in favour of Kashmir valley. Cultural and Religious Alienation: The Buddhist population of Leh, in particular, felt their traditions and identity were threatened by policies and administrative indifference. Religious Provocations: Reports of forced conversions and disregard for Buddhist institutions further inflamed tensions. The immediate spark for the 1989 unrest was, as multiple accounts suggest, a dispute over fishing near a site associated with the Dalai Lama’s birthday. What might have remained a local quarrel escalated rapidly, in part due to the intervention of the Kashmir Armed Police. Their deployment, rather than restoring order, deepened the crisis: sacred Buddhist sites were allegedly desecrated, and Ladakhi grievances were met with coercion rather than dialogue. It was in this context that the slogan “Free Ladakh from Kashmir” gained traction, symbolising not just a communal divide but a demand for political autonomy and dignity. Against this backdrop, Sonam Wangyal’s opposition to the movement appears less a rejection of communalism than a reluctance to engage with the deeper structural issues at play. His stance aligned, whether intentionally or not, with the dominant Kashmiri political establishment, which benefited from portraying the agitation as sectarian rather than as a legitimate call for redress. The broader trajectory of the Wangchuk family thus reflects a pattern of detachment from Ladakh’s mass movements. Their relocation from Alchi to Srinagar already indicated a degree of physical and psychological distancing from the region’s core struggles. In moments when Ladakhis mobilised collectively – most notably in 1989 – the family’s decision was not to participate, but to maintain neutrality or opposition. From an analytical standpoint, this positioning situates the Wangchuk family as political outliers in Ladakh’s modern history. Rather than contributing to the articulation of Ladakhi identity, dignity, and autonomy, their legacy underscores the dilemmas of elite families balancing local loyalties with wider political considerations. (The writer is Member Administration JKCA)
