Dr Ganesh Malhotra
ganeshmalhotra4@gmail.com
The visit of Taliban External Affairs Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to India signals a change in the geopolitics of South Asia. This unprecedented collaboration with the Taliban-led Afghan government demonstrates India’s flexibility and resolve to use cautious pragmatism to protect regional interests. Previously, New Delhi saw the Taliban mainly as a security threat and as Islamabad’s proxy. The subcontinent’s security matrix and India’s strategic calculations depend heavily on the wider implications of this diplomatic approach, particularly with regard to Pakistan.
Following the US withdrawal, Kabul swiftly collapsed in August 2021 following years of building and people-to-people outreach, depriving India of a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan. Once a staunch ally of the Republic government and close to non-Taliban actors, New Delhi saw the Taliban as a violent group largely controlled by Pakistan’s security apparatus. Concerns were raised by India’s sudden closure of its embassy and near-complete blackout with Kabul: Would Taliban rule destroy Afghanistan’s strategic depth and revive anti-Indian terrorism?
India’s cautious response to the Taliban, which initially began with humanitarian aid and covert channels, was a tactical response to the scenario on the ground and a pledge to keeping China and Pakistan from taking advantage of its diplomatic weakness. Given the Taliban’s social policies and problematic connections to extremist organizations, New Delhi also understood the dangers of direct involvement.
India’s commitment was demonstrated when, following months of diplomatic channels that were kept quiet, a brief UN travel waiver allowed Muttaqi to stay in India for eight days. Muttaqi and S. Jaishankar, the Indian External Affairs Minister, reiterated “close communication” and frequent communication, with India pledging its “full commitment” to the sovereignty and advancement of Afghanistan. India’s intention to remain involved in Afghanistan’s humanitarian and developmental issues was demonstrated by its decision to reopen its embassy in Kabul after four years.
According to the Taliban delegation, India, a longtime adversary, expressed “close friendship” and invited Indian companies to participate in Afghanistan’s mining and economic sectors. Not rhetoric without substance. Direct flights between Kabul and Indian towns, more humanitarian aid, and Indian support for people-centred projects in war-torn Afghanistan are examples of cooperation.
India’s increased presence prevents China or Pakistan from exploiting Afghanistan’s power vacuum independently. Both nations have made an effort to capitalize on the shifting dynamics of the region. India would rather participate, albeit cautiously and in small measure, than cede all of its power.
The close ties between Pakistan’s intelligence services and the Taliban are widely known. Nonetheless, India has benefited from the Taliban’s outrage at Pakistan’s autocratic attitude, which is evident in recent bloody border confrontations, economic disputes, and policy autonomy. Rarely used in diplomatic discussions, the India-Taliban statement denounced regional terrorism aiming at Pakistan.
The Taliban’s engagement with India extends beyond trade relations. In light of Kabul’s turbulent relationship with Islamabad, it declares its autonomy from Pakistan and expands diplomatic options for regime legitimacy. By courting India, the Taliban hope to reduce Pakistan’s ability to use force and secure diplomatic recognition and financial support to stabilize Afghanistan’s economy. India’s soft-power approach to fostering goodwill among Afghans and elites includes trade, economic activity, and humanitarian assistance. The Taliban’s economic reliance on China and Pakistan is lessened by open mining and connectivity routes for Indian companies, which could also give them more negotiating power in future trilateral or multilateral agreements.
Pakistan is enraged and nervous about Muttaqi’s visit to India. The growing Delhi-Kabul relationship angered Pakistani officials and media, who dismissed it as a betrayal of Islamist solidarity between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Rising tensions were indicated by high-profile meetings in New Delhi that coincided with clashes on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
The grievances of Pakistan are not just symbolic. Pakistan, which has historically looked to Afghanistan to bolster its claims abroad, blasted the Taliban for their support of “respecting India’s sovereignty” over Jammu and Kashmir. Days prior to his visit to India, Muttaqi openly declined an official invitation from Islamabad. This was a snub that was nearly unimaginable just a few years ago and demonstrated the Taliban’s mounting discontent with Pakistan’s patronage system.
Pakistan believes its influence over the Taliban is eroding. The willingness of the Taliban to openly back India demonstrates to Islamabad that the Afghan government desires an independent foreign policy. Pakistan’s regional security doctrines became more complex as a result, and its capacity to use Afghanistan as a “strategic depth” buffer against India was diminished. The mutual denunciation of terrorism, which specifically targets organizations based in Pakistan, strengthens New Delhi’s stance and draws more attention to Islamabad from around the world.
Since total ostracism in Afghanistan has not worked, Central Asian nations, Iran, and Russia are looking for measured dialogue with the Taliban. As China pushes for economic and connectivity reasons, India acts opportunistically to take advantage of economic and security advantages and cautiously to limit enemy encroachment. This is important because New Delhi made significant investments in the Chabahar port and other regional connectivity projects that impact Afghan trade and transit calculations.
The world maintains a watch on India’s pragmatic nature. New Delhi’s willingness to work with the Taliban demonstrates its ability to adjust to national security, even when ideology and principles clash, even though it does not recognize them and maintains a strong stance against terrorism. Given that the humanitarian and security needs in Afghanistan cannot be ignored, this may encourage other players-particularly those in Europe and Southeast Asia-to exercise flexibility.
India deliberately seeks “engagement without recognition.” New Delhi pursues particular benefits like security guarantees, restrictions on anti-India terrorists, and economic opportunities while remaining ambiguous about the Taliban’s global stance. Sustained development projects, humanitarian assistance, and engagement with Afghan civil society all contribute to preventing further losses and preserving goodwill among Afghans, many of whom are doubtful of Taliban governance.
In the new Afghanistan-India dynamic, India can highlight its strategic balancing role in West and Central Asia by leveraging its geographic and economic advantages. A future in which India seeks significant benefits for both itself and the Afghan people is suggested by the opening of direct flights, the proposal of Indian investments in infrastructure and mining, and practical diplomatic engagement.
Multisectoral economic partnerships, crisis management, and dialogue should all be used to institutionalize this policy change. Working with Iran and the Central Asian nations should also be part of a proactive strategy to stop Afghanistan from turning into a safe haven for terrorists.
The measured but firm approach taken by India toward Pakistan demonstrates its strategic resilience. By strengthening its relationship with Kabul, India challenges the notion that Pakistan has sole control over Afghanistan and creates new pressure points to combat infiltration and terrorism sponsored by Pakistan.
Amir Khan Muttaqi’s trip to India is a significant step against Pakistan’s regional strategy and a practical reset in Indian Afghan policy. Despite the difficulties of interacting with the Taliban, India must put its own interests first, whether that be through dialogue, financial assistance, or security. This engagement will have long-term regional effects as India tries to stabilize its Western frontier through resilience and realism and Pakistan tries to reposition itself.
India’s strategy for Afghanistan will now be characterized by both tactical adaptability and moral toughness, interacting with all parties when necessary for national security without ever sacrificing sovereignty, pluralism, or peaceful coexistence. New Delhi can negotiate these challenging waters with the aid of strategic patience, historical ties, and unwavering engagement.
(The author is J&K based Strategic and Political Analyst)
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