From Accession to Divergence: The Two Faces of Jammu and Kashmir
Dr. Deepak Kapoor
After the legal and complete accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India on 26 October 1947, following the invasion from Pakistan under Operation Gulmarg, Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar to defend the state. The Indian Army successfully pushed back the invading forces from key areas like Baramulla and secured the Kashmir Valley.
However, as the fighting intensified and spread across the mountainous terrain, the situation became increasingly complex. The fighting soon expanded into a full-fledged war between India and Pakistan the first Indo-Pak War (1947-48). As the conflict intensified, Pakistan continued to support and directed its soldiers, in the dress of tribals, inside the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) state of India and thereby occupying large portions of the western territories of this new state, including Mirpur, Muzaffarabad, and Gilgit-Baltistan.
At that time, the newly founded United Nations (UN) made its first international intervention in the J&K affairs in January, 1948. The UN called for an immediate ceasefire and proposed that Pakistan withdraw its forces from the occupied territories and asked India to keep minimum forces required to maintain law and order, followed by a plebiscite under UN supervision to determine the region’s future. However, Pakistan never withdrew its forces from the occupied areas and so the plebiscite could not be done. By the time the ceasefire came into effect on 1st January 1949, a large part of the erstwhile princely state that included Gilgit-Baltistan and a section of western Jammu and Kashmir (now called Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir) continued to be under the troops from Pakistan. Inside the new state of Jammu and Kashmir, the aftermath of war and the deep political divisions erupted and created a volatile situation.
The Maharaja, facing local unrest and growing political pressure, appointed Sheikh Abdullah as the head of the interim government in March 1948. He advocated internal autonomy and democratic reforms under the Indian Union. Later when India adopted its constitution in 1950 an article, the Article 370, was incorporated in it as a temporary measure under the persuasions of Sheikh Abdullah.
This article provided autonomous status to J&K allowing it to have its own constitution, flag, and legislative control over state affairs. In 1954, through a Presidential Order, Article 35A was introduced. This provision empowered the J&K legislature to define “permanent residents” of the state and to grant them rights and privileges, particularly in areas of land ownership, government employment, scholarships, and other forms of public aid. As a result, non-residents of the state could not purchase land or settle permanently in J&K.
This arrangement was temporary and was adopted to ensure that the integration of the state with India occurred gradually and peacefully. However, over the decades, this very provision became a source of political contention, shaping the region’s relationship with the rest of India until its abrogation in 2019. For more than seven decades, the Article 370 defined the region’s constitutional relationship with the Union of India.
The abrogation of Article 370 and Article 35A on 5 th August 2019 marked one of the most significant turning points in the modern history of Jammu & Kashmir. Its revocation and the reorganization of the erstwhile state into two Union Territories, Jammu & Kashmir, and Ladakh which are aimed to bring greater administrative integration, uniformity of laws, and new avenues for economic and infrastructural development.
The change also symbolized a shift in policy focus: from political exception to development inclusion.
The years since 2019 have opened a new chapter in the long narrative of J&K, one that seeks to replace the language of conflict with that of opportunity. With constitutional transformation after August 2019, visible efforts have been made to reorient governance towards connectivity, investment, and welfare. Roads, bridges, tunnels, and new transport networks have expanded accessibility to remote areas.
The completion of major infrastructure projects like the Chenani-Nashri and Zojila tunnels, and the upcoming Udhampur- Srinagar-Baramulla rail link has connected regions that were previously isolated for months due to snow or terrain. This connectivity is an achievement that is a social one, bringing education, healthcare, and trade within closer reach of ordinary citizens.
The shift from fear to hope is visible in small yet powerful ways: reopened schools, revived markets, community festivals, and the growing participation of youth in public life. Tourism, long disrupted by unrest due to thirty five years of terrorism, has experienced a remarkable resurgence post abrogation of Article 370 and 35A.
The influx of domestic and international visitors to Kashmir, Jammu, and Ladakh in recent years has revitalized local economies, generating employment in hospitality, handicrafts, and transport sectors.
Traditional industries such as horticulture, saffron cultivation, and pashmina production are receiving renewed state support, with a new focus on areas such as renewable energy and digital services. The introduction of centrally sponsored schemes directly under Union administration has accelerated the pace of development, with improved accountability and transparency mechanisms.
Education and youth empowerment have become key pillars of this renewed developmental approach. The focus on digital literacy and women’s education, in particular, holds promise for more inclusive progress. The decline in large-scale violence and increased outreach programs have helped restore a sense of normalcy in many districts. Efforts at de-radicalization, community engagement have contributed to greater local participation in governance and civic initiatives.
Panchayati Raj institutions are being strengthened to bring decision-making closer to the grassroots, ensuring that development reflects local needs and aspirations. Peace and security have also shown tentative improvement, although challenges remain. However, the people of Pakistan occupied Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK)) have lived under the shadow of political uncertainty and intermittent conflict. T
he situation and development in PoJK that includes the regions of Gilgit-Baltistan has remained complex since 1947, marked by political control from Pakistan, limited autonomy, and uneven development. After the ceasefire of January 1949, the areas occupied by Pakistan were divided administratively into two parts: one in the south, the PoJK which Pakstan refers as Azad Jammu Kashmir, with its nominal capital at Muzaffarabad, and the Northern Areas, now called Gilgit-Baltistan, in the north.
Though Pakistan refers to PoJK as a self-governing territory, in reality, both regions have been under tight administrative and political control of Islamabad. The territory of erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, the PoJK was given first political recoginition by the Pakistan by adoption of an Interim Constitution Act of 1974 and creation of a legislative assembly and a president.
This arrangement is largely symbolic one only. The PoJK Council, chaired by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, holds overriding authority over key areas such as natural resources, defence, communications, foreign affairs, and financial management. Moreover, any political party contesting elections in PoJK is required by law to support Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.
This effectively restricts political pluralism and thereby silencing proindependence or neutral voices. Gilgit-Baltistan, historically part of the princely state, was administered directly by Pakistan without constitutional recognition until 2009. The Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order (2009) introduced a local assembly and chief minister but retained ultimate power with the Pakistan federal government, particularly through the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan.
Despite later reforms such as the Gilgit-Baltistan Order of 2018, the region still lacks constitutional representation in Pakistan’s parliament and remains outside the country’s formal provincial framework. This political ambiguity has created widespread resentment among locals, who continue to demand full constitutional rights, representation, and control over local resources. Protests and movements calling for autonomy or recognition as Pakistan’s fifth province have surfaced repeatedly but with little tangible progress.
Development in PoJK has been uneven and largely dependent on Pakistan’s central policies. Economically it is one of the least developed regions under Pakistan’s control, despite its rich natural resources and strategic location. Agriculture and small-scale trade are the main local occupations. The Hydropower Project projects over these rivers have brought investment to the region but with limited benefits to the locals. The region suffer from high unemployment, poor healthcare and education facilities, and limited industrial growth.
The region thrives on migrant earnings from the Diaspora in the UK and Gulf countries that form a major part of household income and local business investment. The literacy rate in PoJK is somewhat higher than in many other regions of Pakistan, mainly due to the financial support from its overseas Diaspora. Whereas, the quality of education, availability of trained teachers, and infrastructure in rural areas remain poor. In Gilgit-Baltistan, though blessed with rich natural resources, vast hydropower potential, and tourism opportunities, development has been constrained by centralized control from Islamabad and lack of local decision-making power. Basic infrastructure such as roads, electricity, and clean water supply remains inconsistent.
The presence of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) infrastructure has raised environmental and demographic concerns, with locals fearing loss of land and cultural identity. The education levels are very low, particularly in remote valleys where poverty, geographic isolation, and lack of investment hinder access. Healthcare services are similarly inadequate. In PoJK, frequent political interference, restrictions on media and political dissent, and lack of accountability have hindered democratic functioning and social progress.
The people here face a persistent sense of political exclusion and identity suppression. Political expression is tightly controlled. Pro-independence groups, journalists, and activists who advocate self-determination or criticize Islamabad’s policies face intimidation, arrests, or censorship.
In Gilgit-Baltistan, sectarian tensions between Shia, Sunni, and Ismaili communities have been exacerbated by decades of demographic manipulation and administrative control. The absence of a free press, limited space for political dissent, and periodic crackdowns on protests have made the social atmosphere tense. Human rights groups frequently report cases of arbitrary detentions, suppression of student movements, and curbs on freedom of assembly.
Despite Islamabad’s attempts to project stability, these agitations reveal deep-seated frustration rooted in economic marginalization, political disenfranchisement, and socio-cultural neglect. The overall picture of PoJK today is one of structural dependency and suppressed autonomy. While the region has symbolic local governments, real authority lies with Pakistan’s central institutions.
The divergent paths of these two regions (J&K and PoJK) since 1947 reflect their contrasting political affiliations and governance models. In India, the Jammu and Kashmir, despite challenges from militancy and political fluctuations, evolved through constitutional democracy, social reform, and planned development. PoJK, meanwhile, remained caught in administrative dependency, limited rights, and developmental imbalance. This divergence underscores how integration within a democratic constitutional framework can foster long-term social progress and institution-building.
(The writer is President, PoJK Visthapit Sewa Samiti)