Maj Gen Sanjeev Dogra (Retd)
Sanjeev Dogra (@sanjeev1dogra)
On the outskirts of Srinagar, the shattered remains of the Nowgam Police Station stand as a stark reminder of a cruel paradox. The very explosives seized to protect society ended up killing those who were safeguarding it. Late on the night of 14 November 2025, an accidental explosion ripped through the station, claiming nine lives and injuring more than thirty. Those who died were not bystanders to conflict; they were its quiet professionals, police personnel, forensic experts, revenue officials and a civilian tailor, the foot soldiers of an unseen war against terror. Their sacrifice forces us to confront a difficult, but necessary, question: in our attempt to secure justice and protect the nation, are our systems and safeguards fully aligned with the risks our frontline personnel face?
It is important to underline at the outset that the Nowgam blast was not an act of terrorism in the conventional sense. It was a tragic accident in the aftermath of a successful counter-terror operation. The explosion took place while forensic and police teams were examining more than 300 kg of unstable explosive material, part of an approximately 360-kg cache of chemicals, including ammonium nitrate and related compounds, seized in coordinated raids in Faridabad in the days preceding the incident. These operations had exposed a sophisticated “white-collar” terror module linking Jammu & Kashmir and Faridabad, allegedly involving highly educated professionals and with suspected links to banned outfits. The same network is under investigation for a car bombing near Delhi’s Red Fort on 10 November 2025, where a vehicle loaded with an ammonium-nitrate-based device exploded, killing and injuring several people.
In Delhi, the explosives were employed as a deliberate weapon of terror. In Srinagar, the explosives now in state custody became the source of an unintended disaster. Together, these two events reveal the extended danger curve of terrorism: the threat does not end with seizure; it continues through transport, storage and forensic examination. How we handle seized explosives can be the difference between a quiet operational success and a public tragedy.
With the benefit of hindsight, it does appear that certain risks were underestimated. The key decision was to transport nearly the entire bulk of highly unstable explosive material, about 360 kg from Faridabad to a police station in a populated urban area. Officials have explained that the case’s legal locus lay in Jammu & Kashmir and that a strict chain of custody was required so that evidence remained accessible to the jurisdiction handling the main investigation. This logic is understandable from a procedural and legal standpoint, especially given the complex, inter-state nature of the case. The officers involved were working within the framework, guidance and infrastructure available to them.
However, the episode highlights a broader systemic gap between legal procedure, investigative requirements and contemporary safety norms. India’s Ammonium Nitrate Rules, 2012 framed under the Explosives Act, 1884 clearly stipulate that ammonium nitrate storehouses should not be located in populated areas and that large-quantity storage in such locations is to be avoided. These rules exist because history, in India and abroad, shows that mishandling or improperly storing large quantities of ammonium nitrate can be catastrophic. Seen against this background, moving and then retaining hundreds of kilos of unstable material inside an urban police station, even in an open yard shows how difficult it can be, in real-time operations, to reconcile evidentiary needs with ideal safety practices when dedicated infrastructure is limited.
A safer model for the future is now visible: a “sample-only” approach, in which small, representative quantities are taken and documented for detailed forensic analysis, while the bulk stock is safely neutralised or destroyed at or near the point of seizure, or in a designated remote facility. This does not imply that those on the ground were careless; rather, it indicates that our institutional protocols, facilities and legal provisions need to evolve to make such safer options the default, rather than something that depends on local improvisation.
Ammonium nitrate itself is deceptively ordinary: a common fertiliser and industrial input. Chemically, however, it is a powerful oxidiser. In bulk, especially when contaminated with fuels, organic matter or other incompatible substances as often happens in improvised explosive mixtures, it can become sensitive to heat, friction, shock and confinement. Global history is littered with ammonium nitrate disasters, from Oppau in Germany (1921) to Texas City in the United States (1947), Toulouse in France (2001), Tianjin in China (2015), and the Beirut port explosion of 2020, one of the largest non-nuclear blasts ever recorded. In almost every case, the pattern is similar: large quantities stored together, in inappropriate or sub-optimal locations, with inadequate segregation and safety controls, and a relatively small initiating event, a fire, maintenance sparks, friction or contamination pushing the material beyond a critical threshold.
The Nowgam case appears to echo elements of this global pattern. Eyewitness accounts from injured policemen indicate that the explosion occurred while lac seals were being applied to sacks of explosive material, a process that involves heat. While the precise initiating mechanism is still under forensic investigation and should not be prejudged, the combination of a large bulk quantity, unstable mixed composition, and localised heat and handling during late-night sealing and sampling created conditions under which a catastrophic detonation became possible. This is less a story of individual error and more a reflection of the inherent risks when large caches of sensitive material are handled in facilities never designed for such tasks.
If we are to ensure that such a tragedy is never repeated, expressions of sympathy though essential will not be enough. The Nowgam blast calls for measured but concrete structural reforms, designed in partnership with the very police and forensic agencies that shoulder the daily burden of counter-terror work. First, India urgently needs a network of high-security regional explosives forensics facilities, each equipped with blast-resistant chambers, remote-handling robotic systems and controlled-ventilation rigs for unstable explosives and precursor chemicals. In addition to the lab at Jammu, at least one such facility should be established in Srinagar, given its strategic sensitivity and the frequency of explosives-related cases in the region. Mobile forensic units capable of on-site preliminary testing can further reduce the need to transport bulk explosives over long distances.
Second, storage and handling protocols must be reviewed and refined with a safety-first philosophy, in consultation with operational agencies. Standard Operating Procedures for seized explosives should encourage a strict “sample-only” principle: only small, representative samples need to be retained and sent to laboratories for detailed analysis, while time-bound destruction or controlled neutralisation of bulk stocks should be the norm once legal documentation and preliminary recording are complete. Police stations or other urban administrative buildings should, as far as practicable, be avoided as locations for storing large quantities of unstable explosives, which should instead be shifted to approved, remote magazines or military-grade storage facilities that comply with blast-radius and separation norms. Before any large cache is opened, repackaged or sampled, a bomb disposal or explosives-engineering team-led safety audit should be standard practice.
Third, there is a need to invest further in training and inter-agency coordination. Frontline personnel like police, forensic staff, magistrate teams and local administrators already work in difficult conditions and under high pressure. Regular, advanced training in the properties and hazards of industrial explosives and precursors, safe handling, packaging and segregation, and emergency response and evacuation procedures would add another layer of protection around them. A shared digital platform linking police, intelligence agencies, forensic labs and regulatory authorities could ensure that everyone has real-time visibility of what has been seized, where it is stored, what its risk profile is, and what stage of forensic or legal processing it has reached. Such transparency would help commanders and investigators take informed decisions that balance operational urgency with personnel safety.
Finally, the legal and regulatory framework itself may need strengthening in a calibrated manner. The Ammonium Nitrate Rules, 2012, and related regulations largely focus on manufacture, licensing, transport and industrial storage. They now need explicit provisions for the post-seizure phase in terror and criminal investigations: clear guidance on how long bulk explosive precursors should be kept in custody, indicative norms for location and quantity thresholds for temporary storage, and mandatory documentation of disposal methods and timelines. By codifying these aspects, we would provide investigators and police forces with legal clarity and institutional backing to adopt safer practices, rather than leaving such choices to individual judgement in the midst of complex operations.
The story of Nowgam, therefore, is not one of blame; it is the story of a system under strain, trying to manage 21st-century terror threats with infrastructure and processes that have not fully caught up. The police, forensic experts and officials who died that night were engaged in difficult, high-risk work that had already prevented future attacks. Their courage and professionalism are beyond doubt. The real question for us, as a society and as policymakers, is whether we can now give such personnel the tools, infrastructure and protocols they deserve.
In counter-terrorism, the mission is not only to seize the threat but to manage it safely, intelligently and with full awareness of the risks over its entire life cycle. The Nowgam explosion is a sobering reminder that even the best investigative work can be undone by a single point of systemic weakness. As we mourn the nine lives lost, the most meaningful tribute we can offer them is an unwavering, collective determination to build a safer framework, one in which every police station, every forensic team and every family can have greater confidence that the price of vigilance will not again be so tragically high. The path forward is visible; what remains is the will, and the shared resolve, to walk it together.
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