Col Ajay K Raina
ajaykrraina@gmail.com
Delimitation is often presented as a technical exercise; it is supposed to be neutral, arithmetical, and immune from politics. In reality, it is one of the most consequential instruments in a democracy, because it translates population into power. In Jammu and Kashmir, where political authority has historically been concentrated in one region, the relationship between census data, population growth, and legislative representation demands closer scrutiny-especially as India prepares for its next census in 2026 and a fresh round of delimitation thereafter.
India’s demographic transition since Independence is well established. Between 1951 and 1981, the country experienced rapid population growth driven by high fertility and declining mortality, with decadal growth rates in the range of 23-25 percent. After 1981, a clear shift occurred. Fertility declined across most regions, education levels rose, and population growth began to slow. By the 2001-2011 decade, India’s decadal growth rate had fallen to about 17.6 percent, marking a decisive move into demographic deceleration.
Until the 1971 census, Jammu and Kashmir broadly followed this national pattern. Its population rose from roughly four million in 1941 to about 4.6 million in 1971. This trend was entirely consistent with a largely rural, mountainous region. There was no obvious demographic anomaly, nor any reason to expect political imbalance rooted in population numbers.
That changes after 1981. Between 1981 and 2011, Jammu and Kashmir’s population more than doubled-from about 5.99 million to roughly 12.54 million. The 2001-2011 decadal growth rate, at around 23.6 percent, was significantly higher than the national average of 17.6 percent. At a time when most of India was slowing down, Jammu and Kashmir, particularly the Kashmir Valley, was not.
Here, aggregation conceals the core issue. Jammu and Kashmir has never been demographically uniform. District-level data shows that accelerated population growth is overwhelmingly concentrated in the Kashmir Valley. Jammu region districts largely track India’s national averages, while Ladakh’s growth remains modest due to geography and climate. The divergence, therefore, is not state-wide; it is valley-centric. This matters because legislative representation, and by extension, political power, has historically been determined by population, not territory.
The political consequences of this arithmetic are neither theoretical nor new. Since the inception of electoral politics in Jammu and Kashmir, governments have overwhelmingly been formed from Kashmir-based political formations. Faster population growth in the Valley ensured that this pattern remained structurally intact, irrespective of electoral swings in Jammu. A more balanced demographic trajectory could, over time, have altered that equation.
The timing of the divergence also intersects with politics. In 1975, following the Indira-Sheikh Accord, Sheikh Abdullah returned to power after more than two decades of political marginalisation. For many observers, this marked the consolidation of a Kashmir-centric political order that shaped institutions and priorities for decades. It is in this period that questions about census figures and demographic trends began to surface more openly.
Critics have long argued-without definitive proof, but with persistent circumstantial reasoning-that post-1975 demographic outcomes were politically convenient in preserving the centre of power within the Kashmir Valley. The logic is structural. Had population density and growth remained broadly uniform across the territory, Jammu’s larger geographical size would, over successive delimitations, have yielded greater legislative representation. That, in turn, could have challenged the entrenched assumption that political power must reside in Kashmir.
Major political parties in India have repeatedly called 2011 census as the manipulated one. If this claim is to be trusted, a deeper dive to 1981 consolidates it further. However, establishing deliberate inflation would require granular evidence far beyond aggregate census tables. Yet it is equally unreasonable to ignore the fact that demographic outcomes and political incentives aligned consistently in one direction over several decades. That alignment alone explains why census data in Jammu and Kashmir has attracted sustained scrutiny.
Region 1951-61 1961-71 1971-81 2001-11
India ~23.1 ~24.8 ~25.0 ~17.6
Jammu ~22-24 ~23-24 ~24-25 ~18.0
Kashmir Valley ~24-27 ~26-27 ~27-28 ~23.6
Standard demographic explanations do exist. The Kashmir Valley historically exhibited higher fertility rates, a younger age structure, lower female workforce participation, and delayed adoption of family planning norms. Regions that enter the demographic transition later often continue to grow faster even as national averages decline. These factors explain part of the divergence. However, they do not fully explain its scale or persistence. By the early 2000s, fertility decline was visible even in poorer and socially conservative regions of India, including many Muslim-majority districts outside Kashmir. Yet the Valley continued to record growth rates significantly above the national average. This places it outside the mainstream of India’s demographic transition.
The absence of a full census in Jammu and Kashmir in 1991 further complicates matters. That decade-defined by terrorism and counter-terrorism-remains statistically opaque. Population figures for 1991 were interpolated rather than enumerated, compressing two decades of growth into a single statistical leap between 1981 and 2001. While this does not invalidate the data, it weakens confidence in trend smoothness and increases the margin for error.
Another factor that warrants attention is migration. The 1990s witnessed the large-scale out-migration of Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley. In demographic terms, such an outflow would normally depress population growth. Yet census figures indicate continued robust growth in the Valley despite this exodus. This suggests that natural increase-births minus deaths-was sufficiently high to offset the demographic impact of migration. While this is statistically possible, it reinforces the need to examine fertility and age-structure data more closely.
These concerns acquire renewed relevance today. India is expected to conduct its next census in 2026, and all major national political parties-across ideological lines-have publicly expressed reservations about relying indefinitely on 2011 census data for delimitation and representation. The concern is not confined to Jammu and Kashmir. Recent Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercises in several states have revealed substantial inflation in electoral rolls, leading to the lawful removal of large numbers of ineligible or duplicate entries. These findings not only prove past manipulation elsewhere, but they also do demonstrate that demographic and electoral databases are not infallible and must be periodically audited.
In this context, Jammu and Kashmir cannot afford complacency. Delimitation based on outdated or insufficiently scrutinised population data risks entrenching historical imbalances rather than correcting them. Demography is not destiny by itself, but when translated mechanically into political representation, it becomes a powerful determinant of who governs and who remains perpetually peripheral.
The responsible position lies between denial and accusation. Population growth in Jammu and Kashmir was broadly normal until the early 1970s. From the 1980s onward, the Kashmir Valley followed a demographic trajectory that diverged materially from both national trends and the Jammu region’s experience-one that consistently reinforced a Kashmir-centric political structure. Whether this outcome arose purely from social factors or was influenced by institutional and political dynamics remains an open question.
As India approaches a new census and future delimitation, that question can no longer be avoided. Transparency, rigorous data scrutiny, and an honest conversation about representation are not threats to democracy-they are its safeguard.
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