Harsha Kakar
kakarharsha@gmail.com
While US-Iran talks, were in progress, in Feb, Washington was deploying its second carrier group into the region. It needed an additional carrier group of the coast of Israel, as Iran was bound to retaliate with missiles once it was struck, and Israel’s air defences needed to be boosted. Negotiations were only a delaying mechanism to enable the carrier group to deploy.
They had decided to strike and were awaiting confirmation on the whereabouts of the Ayatollah, who they had to hit in the first wave. If they misjudged, Iran would ensure that he would never be a target as also their aim at regime change would end. All that the US managed by this strike was a change within the regime.
In June last year when Israel launched unilateral strikes on Iran, subsequently drawing in the US, negotiations were ongoing between the US and Iran. In Feb, talks in Geneva had almost reached conclusion with Iran accepting most US demands, when the US-Israel air assault occurred. Trump’s current demands to Iran including dismantling of its nuclear program, handing over its Uranium stockpiles, restricting ranges on its missiles and opening the Straits of Hormuz are almost a repeat of what had almost been agreed to in Feb.
Simultaneously, US troop deployment, including specialized forces, elements of its 82nd Air borne division and marines continue into the region. A sole air campaign, as in progress, has limitations. It can punish an adversary but neither can it impose a regime change nor compel it to capitulate. For this, it is essential to control major assets including economic of the adversary. This can only be done by boots on the ground. The Pentagon claims that deployment of specialized forces is to give options on military operations to the President. It is possible that negotiation demands are again a diversionary and an assault is imminent. Iran has a similar view.
Assessment by the Pentagon would have ruled out any physical assault on the mainland, as Iran’s mountainous terrain benefits the defender as also supports guerilla warfare. The IRGC (Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps) is large, reasonably well trained and has good knowledge of the terrain. Iranian Kurds, based in Iraq and anti the current regime, could be exploited by the US as it did with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. However, their numbers are limited.
The only way Iran can be bought to the negotiating table, in conditions favouring the US and Israel, is by controlling its oil and gas exports as also the Straits of Hormoz. This will impact the internal standing of the regime. As long as Iran dominates the straits, it would claim that it outclassed US military power. For this the US must not only gain control over islands which dominate the Hormuz straits, but also hold onto them against possible counterattacks including drones and missiles launched from the mainland. Holding them for a short period may not imply victory.
The largest and most important island dominating the straits is Qeshm. It overlooks the waterway and is the gateway for any future invasion onto the mainland. In addition is the Kharg island, located away, but the hub of Iran’s oil exports. The other islands of relevance are Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, though smaller but possess weapons and surveillance systems. Thus, all would need to be tackled simultaneously to prevent one from supporting the other. The US has also displayed an intent to gain control of Iran’s reprocessed nuclear material, which is likely to be avoided for now.
Iran would have assessed US intent and has prepared these islands for a possible invasion by constructing underground shelters and weapons storage facilities which are bound to come under intense aerial assaults prior to any ground invasion. Any assault on the islands would be retaliated to by missile and drone strikes from the mainland. Hence, simultaneous targeting of the islands and coastal regions of the mainland is essential.
These islands could be taken with overwhelming military power which the US is expected to employ, but holding onto them is another story. The primary US target would be the Qeshm island alongside Kharg, the others being neutralized in the initial phases and attacked subsequently. None of these assaults would involve use of armour which could be inducted subsequently. In addition is logistics, movement of which could be interfered from the mainland.
Time is of essence and surprise the mantra. Here Iran has an advantage. Deployment of US troops in neighbouring countries for speedy execution is fraught with risks as Iran obtains intelligence on US deployment from Chinese and Russian satellites and possesses missiles to target them. It is already doing so. Their deployment further away would add to time of movement, giving Iran reaction time. It may not be aware of the exact landing area but would be alert.
Further these operations would be sans any other form of fire support, other than air. To ensure success, defences and military bases on all islands and the mainland would need to be suppressed simultaneously. This implies that the US would be launching operations far from its homeland with limited support, however applying overwhelming air power.
The US may succeed as it and Israel firepower combined is immense. However, there are issues. Firstly, these operations will involve US casualties and these would be in a war where there was no threat to it. Will it be acceptable to the US public, especially in an election year. Anti-war protests have drawn huge crowds in the US. Secondly, global oil prices would skyrocket and impact the world, damaging US standing. Added would be Iranian retaliatory strikes on Middle East oil facilities further reducing oil availability.
Finally, even if the US initially succeeds, will it be able to hold onto these islands for long. Iran’s strategy is to outlast the adversary by tiring him out and that is possible by denying reinforcements and logistics while pounding them from the mainland. It could make sustainability of troops on these objectives difficult.
The US may have considered all options but the only thing it cannot accept at this stage is failure, while Iran only has to exhaust its adversaries to succeed. Will the US risk failure or will it avoid attacking is to be seen.
The author is Major General (Retd)
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