Tarun Upadhyay
tarunupadhyay9@gmail.com
Identity is an existential condition-anchored at the very core of human consciousness-framing the timeless question, “Who am I?” in both personal and collective dimensions. It functions as a bridge between one’s inner self and the outer world of relationships, culture, and politics.
The question of identity-shaped as much by self-reflection as by external perception-acquires particular poignancy when raised within a small, marginalized community. Devoid of political or administrative leverage and surrounded by a larger population with which it shares limited cultural affinity, such a community often grapples to assert its distinct sense of being.
Ladakh has been grappling with sense of “marginalised being” for long for host of reasons. It lacked genuine self-governance since its conquest by the Dogra rulers in 1834, when it was incorporated into the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. It was first administered from Jammu, then from Srinagar after 1947, and since 2019, from New Delhi. The long absence of self-governing authority has, quite naturally, deepened the region’s sense of existential unease.
Perceiving itself as marooned amid “outsiders,” the community’s alienation-though perhaps more perceptual than material-runs profoundly deep.Within this context, from the Ladakh’s -read Leh- the question of identity becomes an enduring anxiety for a community excluded from the machinery of governance.
The population of Ladakh is about 3 lakh. The Buddhist population in Leh about 89,000, which is approximately 0.006% of India’s total population and thus often politically marginalized. In the absence of its own dedicated administrative agency for a long time, state decisions-viewed from Leh’s perspective-have tended to feel less like participatory governance and more like gestures of patronage.
Over decades sense of “disempowerment” got entrenched, stoking simmering discontent and anger. It first surfaced in 1969 agitation for the Scheduled Tribe status which was marked by sporadic incidents of violence.
About a decade later the demand re-surfaced. A month long dharna by Buddhist Action Committee spearheading the demand was suspended on Jan 22, but as talks with the then J&K Government didn’t yield result, it turned violent.
Two people got killed in police firing on Jan 24, 1981. Violent protests since then gained an agency. As even deaths didn’t yield the desired results, the seemingly “indifferent” attitude response of then J&K Government further deepened the sentiment among Leh residents – particularly Buddhists – that they were treated as “lesser children of God”.
It was no surprise that discontent soon escalated into demands for Union Territory status. The year 1989 witnessed some of the most violent protests in Ladakh’s history, particularly in Leh, marked by frequent bandhs, curfews, and clashes.
The Ladakh Buddhist Association, which spearheaded the movement, described Ladakh as a “nation” in its pamphlets and argued that UT status was essential to safeguard its “identity,” which they believed was under threat from Kashmir.
Thuftsan, then president Ladakh Buddhists’ association, in a 1989 interview said “We have been tolerating since long.. there is a limit to everything.”
On Aug 27, 1989, three protesters were killed in Leh in police firing. The deaths forced the Government to expedite the process of granting ST status. The President promulgated the Constitution (Jammu and Kashmir) Scheduled Tribes Order, 1989, granting ST status on Oct 7, 1989.
The loss of lives shattered an already fragile bridge of trust. The President’s Order was widely regarded as too little, too late. In this vacuum of faith, subaltern ‘sub-nationalism’-long poised at the threshold of nationalism-pushed the demand for Union Territory status, envisioned as the ‘final solution’ to “liberate” the region from the overbearing grip of a Kashmir-centric J&K Government.
At the tripartite talks between the central Government, the State Government and LBA leaders on October 29, 1989, an agreement was reached whereby the LBA withdrew its demand for Union Territory status in favour of an Autonomous Hill Council on the lines of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council
Even though the Government passed the Hill Development Council Act for Leh on October 3, 1993, elections were delayed, Act was left defunct and people disillusioned.
Frequent deferment of the Hill Council disturbed the youth who revived the agitation in April 1995. LBA gave call for boycott of crucial and critical 1996 J&K assembly elections to be first election after nine-year when J&K which was in grip of terrorism.
The then Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao enacted the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council Act on May 9, 1995. While it loosened the “chains” of Kashmir’s dominance, a lingering sentiment persisted in Leh – that they were still not truly “free”. Many felt that unless those chains were completely broken, they could never be the true “masters” of their own destiny
UT status – the “final” and “ultimate” goal – was finally achieved on August 5, 2019, when Ladakh was bifurcated from Jammu and Kashmir through the J&K Reorganisation Act. Leh erupted in joy, while Kargil protested. However, six years down the line, the perceived panacea has come to be seen as a chimera.
UT is governed directly by the Centre, and its role becomes more dominant in the absence of a legislative assembly. This leaves little scope for local participation in decision-making.
Early this year, LAHDCs – both Leh and Kargil – the only elected bodies in Ladakh, saw their budgets reduced from ?344 crore each to ?272 crore each, Following widespread protests, the cuts were rolled back and the allocation was restored to ?370 crore each. In contrast, the overall UT budget stands at around ?6,000 crore.
Given the LAHDC’s limited powers, the allocation may appear adequate on paper. But from the local perspective, the stark gap between the LAHDC and UT budgets revives a sentiment that has lingered since 1834: “When will we be our own masters?”
The long-held aspiration of Ladakhis to be “masters of their own destiny” resurfaced just four months after UT status. In December 2019, the Ladakh Students’ Environmental Action Forum (LEAF) staged protests in Leh demanding inclusion under the Sixth Schedule. Over the past six years, Leh has witnessed five major protests and hunger strikes for Statehood and 6th Schedule Status.
Although the Centre reserved 85% of jobs for locals, unemployment among Ladakh’s graduates surged from 9.8% in 2021-22 to 26.5% in 2022-23-well above the national average of 13-15%. The agency responsible for addressing itis based in New Delhi, which remains perceptually distant from the ground realities.
Democracy thrives when every individual’s voice matters, not when numbers alone dictate influence. For a small population, being heard is not optional-it is essential. In Ladakh, recurring protests are a stark reminder of the growing perceptual and cultural distance between Leh and New Delhi. The Centre may have opened a more direct route to Leh, but unless it listens to the region’s disquiet and engages meaningfully, that road will remain as rough and uneasy as the alienation that fuels these protests.
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