Ashok Bhan
ashokbhan@rediffmail.com
As 2025 draws to a close, Kashmir’s political story reads less like a turning point and more like an extended aftermath. The year was dominated not by new constitutional changes but by the enduring consequences of the August 2019 revocation of Article 370 and the unresolved demand for restoration of statehood. Six years on, the question was no longer whether the move would reshape Kashmir’s politics, but how deeply and for how long it would continue to do so.
At the formal level, 2025 began with a sense of cautious political normalisation. The legislative assembly elected in October 2024 was in place, and an elected government led by the Jammu & Kashmir National Conference was functioning in Srinagar. Omar Abdullah’s return as chief minister in 2024 was widely projected as a revival of regional politics after years of central rule. Yet 2025 demonstrated the limits of this normalisation. Power remained circumscribed by the Union Territory framework, and the chief minister’s authority often ran up against the lieutenant governor’s office, keeping alive the perception of a democratic deficit.
Throughout 2025, statehood dominated political discourse in a way few other issues did. Almost every major debate in the assembly, every public rally, and every opposition statement returned to the same refrain: that without restoration of full statehood, elected politics would remain hollow. The Supreme Court’s 2023 ruling, which upheld the revocation of Article 370 but directed the government to restore statehood at an appropriate time, hung over the year like an unresolved promise. The absence of a timeline allowed suspicion to fester, with regional parties accusing New Delhi of using elections as a substitute for genuine federal accommodation.
The year also laid bare how polarised local politics has become. Assembly proceedings were frequently disrupted by acrimonious exchanges, walkout,s and, at times, physical scuffles. These scenes were not merely about partisan rivalry; they reflected deeper disagreements over governance, security priorities and the meaning of autonomy in a post-370 Kashmir. Rather than calming the political waters, the return of electoral politics sometimes amplified tensions that had been suppressed during years of central rule.
Security, as ever, remained the other axis around which 2025 revolved. In April, a major militant attack in the Pahalgam area killed dozens of civilians, delivering a sharp jolt to official claims of sustained normalcy. The attack had cascading effects. Tourism, which had been steadily recovering, suffered an immediate setback. Hotel bookings were cancelled, transporters lost business, and thousands of daily-wage workers felt the impact. Politically, the incident reinforced the argument of those who say that security improvements in Kashmir remain fragile and reversible.
The state’s response was predictably muscular. Counter-insurgency operations intensified, particularly in south Kashmir, with security agencies highlighting successes in dismantling militant networks. Operations such as those in Kulgam district were projected as evidence that militancy was on the back foot. Yet the heavy security footprint also ensured that ordinary life continued under the shadow of surveillance and checkpoints. Incidents like the Nowgam explosion in Srinagar in November, officially described as accidental, added to a broader sense of unease that defined the year’s security environment.
Kashmir’s internal developments in 2025 were inseparable from rising India-Pakistan tensions. The Pahalgam attack triggered diplomatic escalation, culminating in India’s decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty. This marked a significant shift, transforming a long-standing water-sharing agreement into a tool of political signalling. Pakistan responded with sharp rhetoric and renewed calls for an internationally supervised plebiscite in Kashmir, positions India firmly rejected. These exchanges ensured that Kashmir remained not just a domestic governance challenge but a central element of South Asia’s strategic instability.
The international dimension complicated policymaking at home. On the one hand, New Delhi insisted that Jammu and Kashmir was an internal matter, especially after the constitutional changes of 2019. On the other hand, developments on the ground repeatedly spilled into India’s foreign policy calculations. This duality was evident throughout 2025, with Kashmir treated simultaneously as a Union Territory to be administered and as a geopolitical dispute to be managed.
Economically, the year was marked by fragility rather than collapse. While infrastructure projects continued and official statistics pointed to incremental gains, the ground reality was uneven. Terror-related disruptions hit tourism hard, while horticulture and handicrafts struggled with market access and uncertainty. Youth unemployment remained a persistent concern, feeding a sense of frustration among a generation that has grown up almost entirely in a conflict-shaped environment. Civil society groups continued to raise alarms about shrinking civic space, press freedom and the long-term impact of prolonged security controls on social trust.
By late 2025, the broad contours of Kashmir’s predicament were clear. The region had an elected government but not the powers associated with statehood. It had improved electoral participation, but unresolved questions of legitimacy and autonomy. It experienced relative calm in some months, only to see it punctuated by spectacular violence. Above all, it remained trapped in the long shadow of the 2019 decision, with Article 370 serving as both a political reference point and a symbol of loss for many.
A central lesson of 2025 is that Kashmir policy cannot be compartmentalised. Domestic governance, security management, and India-Pakistan relations intersect too closely to be handled in isolation. Treating Jammu and Kashmir purely as an administrative unit while simultaneously invoking it as a strategic flashpoint has produced an internally inconsistent approach. Restoring statehood, with clarity and credibility, would not resolve all of Kashmir’s problems, but the year’s events suggest it is difficult to rebuild trust without it.
As Kashmir moves into 2026, the challenge remains one of balance. Security is necessary, but it cannot substitute for political confidence. Elections matter, but empowerment matters more. Economic packages can ease hardship, but they cannot replace dignity and participation.
The issue of return of the exiled community living as refugees in their own Country for more than 35 years is still not addressed.There is no plan in sight as a return module for this illustrious community to return back to their homeland, they are longing for.
The year 2025 did not deliver closure on any of these fronts. Instead, it underscored a reality Kashmir has lived with for decades: that stability, when it comes, will be the product of sustained political engagement, not constitutional shortcuts or security claims alone.
(The author is a Senior Advocate in Supreme Court of India.)
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