Ansh Chowdhari
There have been many anecdotes – original and otherwise, that continue to waft through the political zephyr of Jammu and Kashmir’s modern history with regards to the Maharaja’s association with Sardar Patel and his role in ensuring the state’s accession to India. The idea that Sardar Patel having a muscular, iron clad approach vis-a-vis the then J&K’s situation, unlike Nehru, ultimately veered the Maharaja to venture onto the ship being sailed by the Indian leaders, has gained a wider traction ever since the present dispensation has taken up the reins in 2014. Therefore, it becomes indispensable to critically analyse the role of Patel and present that to the public at large for ensuring that biases, if any, don’t constitute the bedrock of the fundamental narratives of our history- all the more so, because of the crucial crossroad where the people of J&K are standing right now. Sardar’s general attitude concerning the States was very clear and pragmatic. He would accept no compromise to the principle of democratisation, though he was prepared to regulate the pace. While Nehru had an emotional affinity with Kashmir due to his own connection with this place, apart from his personal association with Abdullah, Sardar dealt with issues more realistically and that’s why he preferred to back the Maharaja on occasions more than one or perhaps, all princes in general as far as the issue of accession was concerned. Patel writing to Maharaja on July 3, 1947 says that “I am sorry to find that there is considerable misapprehension in your mind about the Congress. As an organisation, the Congress is not opposed to any Prince in India”.
Contrary to this, Nehru was sternly against the institution of feudal kings and wanted them to delegitimize as early as possible. But both Patel and Nehru explicitly vouchsafed their firm commitment to making the state of J&K accede to India, albeit in their own peculiar ways, which at times awkwardly ran into each other. The very first instance of this can be seen in one the letters that Patel had written to DP Misra on 11 July 1946 after Nehru was arrested by the J&K government. Patel wrote, “His action in Kashmir, his interference in the Sikh election to the Constitution Assembly. Are all acts of emotional insanity”. But after the 3rd June plan announced by Mountbatten, it dawned on the Indian leaders to intercede with the different states in order to make them accede to India and Patel took a lead in this respect.
Two months before Independence, on a visit to Kashmir between June 18 and 23, 1947, Lord Mountbatten told Maharaja Hari Singh, “If Kashmir joined Pakistan, this would not be regarded as unfriendly by the Government of India”. He added, “He had a firm assurance on this from Sardar Patel himself”. This has been corroborated by V Shankar in his, “My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel” as well. It meant that the state’s department was absolutely in line with the possibility that Mountbatten had proffered before the Maharaja. This sentiment has recurred in the Patel’s correspondences with his colleagues and other leaders. And that’s why Rajmohan Gandhi, author of ‘Patel, A life’ indicates that “Vallabhbhai’s lukewarmness about Kashmir had lasted until September 13, 1947”. In a letter that morning to Baldev Singh, India’s first Defence Minister, he said that “if (Kashmir) decides to join the other Dominion”, he would accept the fact. But, on July 3, Patel writes to R C Kak saying that “I realise the peculiar difficulties of Kashmir, but looking to its history and its traditions, it has, in my opinion, no other choice.” The choice that Patel was referring to gets cleared up in another letter that he had written to the Maharaja on the same day saying, “I wish to assure you that the interest of Kashmir lies in joining the Indian Union and its Constituent Assembly without any delay. Its past history and traditions demand it, and all India looks up to you and expects you to take that decision”. Patel’s ambiguity probably stemmed from the fact that the boundary commissions hadn’t declared its award yet and the fate of J&K was still hanging in the balance, partly due to Maharaja’s indecisiveness and partly due to uncertainty around the Radcliffe award or he may have wanted to test the waters in the state. Another issue that allowed for such ambiguity was the Patel’s abiding involvement in integrating the myriads of princely states into the soon-to-be-formed Indian dominion and hence VP Menon’s admission that “if truth be told, I for one had simply no time to think of Kashmir”. This reflects that Patel, probably regarded J&K out of his bounds then, for the state lacked a clear road link with the rest of India and was dependent on Pakistan for the food, communications and fuel supplies. However, I see it as Patel’s unflinching belief in the ruler being the ultimate authority to determine the future course for his state, which, in this case was Maharaja Hari Singh and that’s why, despite his repeated reminders to the state to accede to India earlier, he was ready to accept the obverse as a fait accompli. Even otherwise, to talk of acceding J&K to India without a viable communication was a plain foolery.
But, no sooner had Patel got to know about the Maharaja’s intentions to join India than he ventured swiftly to strengthen the communication lines between the state of J&K and India. V Shankar states, ‘He (Patel), however, did authorise, on his own, the then Chief Engineer, B.S. Puri, to improve the condition of the Madhopur-Kathua road so as to provide such a link.’ On 5 July, 1947, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel issued a statement explaining that apart from defence, external affairs, and Communications, the states would have an autonomous existence in the new Union. This would have generated a confidence among the princes who were vacillating in their positions including Maharaja Hari Singh. Sardar Patel also played a pivotal role in making the Maharaja remove his pro-independence PM Ram Chandra Kak on August 12 who was being supported by the Muslim Conference in this endeavour. Even the appointment of Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan as the PM later, was due to the efforts of Patel only. Mahajan writes in his autobiography that, ‘He (Patel) not only encouraged me but practically ordered me to accept the offer (of PM) and asked me to proceed to Srinagar at once.’ He also asked Mehar Chand Mahajan to send a special messenger to Guru Golwalkar, the then RSS Chief, with a request to press upon Maharaja Hari Singh to join the Indian Dominion. It must be pointed that the relationship between the Patel and the Maharaja was intact and he was perhaps the only person in the Congress that Maharaja wholly trusted and that’s why Indian Congress entrusted Sardar Patel with the task of persuading the Maharaja Hari Singh to take a realistic view of the political developments in the state which can be seen from a letter that Nehru wrote to Patel on Sept 27,1947 saying, ‘Your advice will naturally go a long way either to the Maharaja or to Mahajan’.
Meanwhile, the constant reports of the impending attack on the state of J&K raised many hackles in New Delhi and this was the reason that Patel ultimately had to close ranks with Nehru. This is manifestly evident in the letter that Patel wrote to the Maharaja on October 2, advising the latter to proclaim a general amnesty and release political prisoners. Patel also wrote to Sardar Baldev Singh on October 7 stating, “I hope arrangements are in train to send immediately supplies of arms and ammunition to Kashmir state. If necessary, we must arrange to send them by air”. This was in response to an indent that the Maharaja’s government had sent to Delhi on October 1. Patel again wrote to Mehr Chand Mahajan on October 21st saying that “it’s my sincere an earnest advice to you to make a substantial gesture to win Sheikh Abdullah’s support”. Patel as well as Nehru decidedly acknowledged the importance of J&K for India and therefore thwarted the attempts of the British generals to limit the Indian operations in the valley. The Cabinet Defence Committee decided on October 25 that that the Army HQs should supply arms to J&K forces. In the same meeting, Patel objected to Mountbatten’s apprehension that India sending arms to neutral state can bring the two dominions at the brink of a war by claiming that India should respond to the help sought by a friendly state which had been invaded and therefore, Menon accompanied by two officers arrived in Srinagar to assess the situation. And the next day, i.e., on 26th October, Maharaja sealed the deal and acceded J&K with India at Jammu. In this entire process, the role played by Patel was crucial in ways more than one. By maintaining an active relationship with the Maharaja, he ensured that J&K comes into the fold of India once it was clear to him that, Pakistani machinations post the Radcliffe Award are going to be devastating for the state in particular and India in general. He also deflated the Britishers’ nefarious designs that were supposedly meant to provide Pakistan with a strategic depth in the state for her own safety. However, that doesn’t mean that under certain practical compulsions, one has to always deify Patel at the expense of Nehru, which is happening right now. White and black narratives can’t define any personality.