Prof. Danuta Hübner
The unprecedented environment in which Ukraine has been preparing for European Union membership, reminds the fight for its future goes beyond the battlefield and security guarantees, including its reconstruction and integration. This accession is not only about the benefits of membership for Ukraine, but about it taking its share of responsibility for the European continent. In short, this is a path toward a stronger and more resilient Europe, a historic opportunity for Ukraine and Europe regarding development of new markets, strengthening of supply chains, and of stability in a region historically prone to instability.
Ukraine’s close ties with the EU did not begin with its application for membership. They have been growing since 1994, when the first EU-Ukraine partnership agreement was signed. At that time, and after 2004 enlargement, both European Commission (EC) and European Parliament (EP), maintained close contacts with Ukraine in support of institutionalising the relations, including trade, single market, regional policy and democracy.
It’s also true that when at start of 1990s preparing the first ever Eastern enlargement had begun, Ukrainian politicians and officials were expressing their deep worries that this major Eastern enlargement would be a new European iron curtain.
There are many similarities between the Eastern enlargements of EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013, but differences too. Certainly, their enormous geostrategic importance and democratic consolidation of this part of the continent gave a strong base for making this gigantic step. From the economic point of view, it was both a challenge and an unprecedented opportunity. But it was also a huge administrative effort for countries with no tradition of civil service, no capabilities of horizontal coordination, or territorial solidarity, with dominant vertical structures, low wages and social status of those employed in public administration.
In 1990s, when countries of Central and Eastern Europe were preparing for EU accession, the world around was divided. New countries emerged practicing democracy, but assertive regimes of autocrats and dictators remained in the neighbourhood. Accession to EU was a guarantee of the irreversibility of the transition to a market economy and democracy, freedom and security.
Today, geopolitical polarisation is much stronger and unpredictable. The EU is undergoing a profound revolution, reinventing itself to boost its security, competitiveness potential and its global role. Transatlantic relations, which were mutually reinforcing, are no longer so. Political will among 27 member states to move forward on the new “big bang enlargement” doesn’t seem cast in stone.
While before 2004 opponents of enlargement came up with a theory the Union should first deepen and only then expand, the only reform imperative was related to political reform. Eventually, the treaty was amended. This was considered justified by the necessity of institutional adjustments.
In 2022, when Ukraine and Moldova received the candidate status, joining other candidate countries, the intention was to demonstrate to Putin what was Europe’s preferred political order on our continent. That was European geopolitical reaction to aggression. While previous Eastern enlargements were about democracy, the current one is first about security. Yet security is not part of the accession negotiations. While not all EU members are NATO members, enhanced defence cooperation implies collective defence efforts. Also, we see growing presence of China in candidate countries, expanding its influence, linked to security.
The questionnaires and the screening could have allowed the Commission to link better enlargement and defence policies to evaluate candidates’ readiness for a geopolitically stronger Europe and alignment of defence sectors. Of course, greater EU oversight could be rejected by candidates or member states, but then another mechanism would be needed for the enlarged Union to ensure defence cooperation leading to integration and interoperability in the security domain, for non-NATO states.
There are some aspects of the current enlargement process, where doubts emerge regarding its adequacy to the challenges and forces behind it. The abuse by some member states of using negotiation blocking power. This is not a novelty, but its geopolitical and ideological nature is. The tradition of blocking accession negotiations started with Greece blocking in 2008 Macedonia, preparing to join NATO and the most advanced candidate for membership in Western Balkans. The agreement was reached in 2018, but then the veto came from Bulgaria demanding from the Northern Macedonia a change of its constitution.
Undoubtedly both vetoes had dramatically negative impact not only on the enlargement process but also on political situation in the candidate country. Hungary vetoes the initiation of negotiations with Ukraine, pairing it with Moldova. It is true for continuation of the system where all elements of negotiation process are approved through unanimity. This is not demanded by the treaties and is a sheer political practise.
There seemed to be understanding that Ukraine’s accession cannot be considered in the cost and benefit perspective only. There is hardly any public visibility of a debate about how EU will benefit from this enlargement economically and geopolitically, and how the global influence of Europe will be strengthened. The same is true for prevailing understanding that Ukraine’s accession would strengthen the EU competitiveness and innovation potential.
A deeper reflection on the new enlargement takes place mostly in some European think tanks. Lack of political understanding of the risk related to extending the negotiation period, in particular in case of Ukraine, leading to a kind of permanent candidate status, known only too well by some candidates from Western Balkans, not to mention Turkey, generates a risk that as time goes by, especially as the war drags on, public opinion in EU could shift towards perceiving Ukraine as a burden.
Experience shows negotiations shouldn’t last more than four years. There might also be French referendum on the next enlargement, to be decided by newly elected President in 2027 elections in France. This will decide on Europe’s integration.
While this enlargement seems to be a European imperative, its link with European reforms, not long ago seen as necessary, has been lost. At same time the EC President made it clear there’s no appetite for Treaty change. But she has announced a new generation of Accession Treaty. That might imply redefinition of what membership means which sounds deeply controversial or that those ready to join from day one would not be granted full rights as member states enjoy. It seems this approach goes beyond transition periods or enhanced cooperation and implies some sort of safeguards followed by additional verification mechanisms– meaning going back to mechanism applied to Bulgaria and Romania, which didn’t pass a test of effectiveness.
We might be back to the concept of enlargement based on the principle “all but institutions”. The Union would wait first for its own political will to introduce institutional reform and then proceed with full rights for new members. So, it would be a solution without legal basis. This approach might lead to a different from already established concept of progressive enlargement.
When it was proposed by EC it was not trusted by Ukrainians, who saw it as a delaying full accession factor. Potentially redefined progressive integration might be used as an integration mechanism for a slower process. That might mean the new generation of Accession Treaty could offer progressive integration which would be rather a regressive one.
A commitment for such a review was made by the Commission President in EP in March 2024. In this context several research institutions made proposals regarding the cost of this enlargement for the European budget. The commitment was several times postponed, the last date mentioned was the November 4th, combining the policy review with enlargement package 2025. Again, there was no report on that date. In October 2025, the EP has adopted their own report.
It is good to hear from EC that enlargement is the best geopolitical investment of the Union. It’s clear that Russian invasion on Ukraine and political situation in Belarus are a proof of the failure of both European neighbourhood and enlargement policies. But between February 2022 and beginning of 2026 four years have passed, accession negotiations with Ukraine cannot be triggered since one member state is blocking them.
Meanwhile, Chinese expansion in Europe has exploded. The failure of presenting the reform of policies, shows rather a cautious position of EC in context of ambiguity of Council. The possibility of the big enlargement is off the table. Whatever the enlargement model will be, and I think the most likely a kind of regatta approach will be reality, one day the moment will be reached when there will be the Union of 35.
And it’s unimaginable that one day the EU could say to candidates that it’s not ready to offer them membership. There is no reason why a coalition of the willing could not launch such a debate. It is very important that the Union spares no effort and does not allow that in public domain appear ideas that are taking the credibility of the enlargement process down. This is undermining Europe’s objective to enhance its global position, its democracy consolidation, its security. —INFA
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